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ABSTRACT 
This study reviews the federal funding of postsecondary education under the 
Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangements introduced in 1977. Since 
1977, federal transfers to the provinces for financing postsecondary education 
have increased in line with the growth rate of nominal gross national product, 
rather than in line with operating costs. This implies that the block funding 
arrangements have actually slowed the growth of federal contributions for the 
support of postsecondary education. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude examine le système du financement d'enseignement postsecondaire 
dans le cadre du financement des programmes établis (FPE) autorisés par la loi de 
1977 en vertu des accords fiscaux entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces. 
Depuis 1977, les transferts fédéraux aux provinces, à titre du financement 
d'enseignement postsecondaire, ont augmenté en proportion du taux de croissan-
ce du produit national brut en terme réel plutôt qu'en proportion de la croissance 
des frais de fonctionnement des institutions postsecondaires. Ceci implique que le 
système de financement inconditionnel a, en somme, ralenti l'aide fédérale aux 
provinces. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, universities and colleges across Canada have been faced with 
severe cutbacks due to inadequate funding from the provincial governments. 
These cutbacks have caused numerous financial problems to the postsecondary 
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institutions, for examples: overcrowded classrooms, staff layoffs, reduced library 
hours, insufficient laboratory equipment, and, in some cases, even cancellation of 
programs. As a consequence, many postsecondary institutions have been forced 
to raise tuition fees and impose enrolment quotas in order to solve these financial 
problems. Faced with persistent protests from the students and the academic 
community in general, the provincial governments defend their positions by 
claiming that reduced fundings to postsecondary education are necessary because 
they do not receive sufficient transfer payments from the federal government. In 
order to understand the underlying cause of the financial problems of higher 
education, it is important to examine how the federal government has actually 
transferred funds to the provinces for financing postsecondary education. 
This study is concerned with the federal contributions to postsecondary 
education under the Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangements 
introduced in 1977. Prior to 1977, the federal funding of postsecondary education 
was financed by a conditional matching grant based on postsecondary operating 
costs (Boadway, 1980; Carter, 1982; Department of Finance, April 1981). Since 
1977, postsecondary education has been financed by a lump-sum block grant, in 
which the federal per capita contribution to the provinces increases in line with the 
growth of gross national product. The purpose of this study is threefold: first, to 
show how the federal contribution to postsecondary education is determined; 
second, to present the trends in federal contributions from an economic perspec-
tive; third, to discuss the implications of the block funding to postsecondary 
education. 
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ESTABLISHED 
PROGRAMS FINANCING 
In 1977, the federal government replaced the conditional cost-sharing federal 
transfers for postsecondary education with an unconditional grant as one of the 
components of the overall federal transfer payments to provinces on social 
programs. The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs 
Financing Act of 1977 provided a new method of financing the three established 
programs, namely hospital insurance, medicare and postsecondary education. 
The term "established programs" suggested that these social programs were by 
then well-established and the provinces were not likely to make major changes in 
their structures. 
Under the new arrangements, the federal government contributed a lump-sum 
block grant covering these three social programs and replacing separate grants for 
each one of them. However, 32.1 percent of the federal transfers were allocated to 
postsecondary education, 50.5 percent to hospital insurance and 17.4 percent to 
medicare expenditures.1 The main characteristic of this new funding formula was 
that for all three programs federal contributions are determined independently of 
program costs in the provinces. Growth in the federal contribution was based on 
increases in the Gross National Product. 
Like the previous cost-sharing arrangements, the block funding was fairly 
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complex. The federal grant to the province consisted of both tax transfers and cash 
transfers. The tax transfer consisted of a federal reduction of one percent of the 
corporate income tax and 13.5 percent of the personal income tax, thus giving an 
equivalent amount of tax room to the provinces. Since the yields from the tax 
transfer differred widely from province to province, the tax points were equalized 
to the national average.2 
The cash transfer was based on three different components. The first component 
was the "basic cash contribution" based on 50 percent of the national average per 
capita federal contributions to the three established programs in the base year 
1975-76, plus $7.63 per capita.3 The latter amount represented the cash equivalent 
of one equalized personal income tax point per capita in 1975-76 in order to partly 
compensate provinces for the termination of the 1972 revenue guarantee 
program.4 The basic cash component was indexed to the growth of nominal per 
capita GNP and the growth of the province's population.5 
The second component was the "transitional adjustment payment" which was 
equal to the difference between the basic cash contribution and tax transfers. If the 
value of the tax transfers fell short of the value of the basic cash contribution, then 
the province would receive the difference in the form of a cash payment. Hence, no 
province would lose by accepting part of the federal contribution in the form of tax 
transfer rather than in cash. 
The third component was the "levelling adjustment payment" which aimed to 
eliminate the interprovincial disparities in the per capita federal contribution. Prior 
to the EPF arrangements, there were substantial differences in the base year per 
capita federal contribution among the provinces. Hence, a levelling adjustment 
was needed to smooth the transition from the previous shared-cost arrangements to 
the new block-funding arrangements. Provinces whose per capita federal 
contribution below the national average in the base year would be brought up to the 
national average in three years and the provinces above would be brought down to 
the national average in five years. 
In fact, the EPF arrangements marked a new era of federal-provincial 
co-operation. The negotiations between the federal government and the provincial 
governments resulted in a satisfactory funding formula. The outcome of the fiscal 
arrangements actually involved a political compromise among the provinces. 
Initially, British Columbia and Alberta wanted the transfers all in tax points while 
the Atlantic provinces wanted the transfers all in cash. As a result of the 
compromise, the actual transfers were paid partly in cash and partly in tax points. 
In 1982, the EPF arrangements remained largely unchanged when the initial 
five-year agreements were renewed after federal-provincial negotiations.6 The 
major change was that the total federal contributions to the three established 
programs for 1982-83 and subsequent years were equal to the national average per 
capita federal contribution in 1975-76 (not 50 percent as in the period from 1977 to 
1982), multiplied by the growth of provincial population and GNP escalator. The 
value of cash transfers was determined by deducting the combined value of the 
transferred personal and corporate income tax points from the total fiscal transfers. 
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In sum, the complexity of the old funding procedure was simplified, to a 
considerable extent, by the 1982 change. 
In March 1983, the federal government announced that the annual growth of per 
capita federal contribution for postsecondary education would be limited to six 
percent in 1983-84, and to five percent in 1984-85. These restraints on federal 
transfers to postsecondary education were an extension of the federal govern-
ment's "six and five" program introduced in June 1982 - a program that limited the 
wage increase of all civil servants and employees of the Crown corporations by six 
percent in 1982-83 and by five percent in 1983-84 in order to lower the rate of 
inflation.7 
FINANCING TRENDS 
This section presents the essential trends in federal funding of postsecondary 
education between 1977 and 1983. Table 1 shows the cash and tax transfers to the 
provinces with respect to postsecondary education for the fiscal year 1979-80. As 
can be seen from the figures in Table 1, the total cash transfers for all provinces 
exceeded the value of tax transfers for all provinces except Quebec and Alberta. 
Quebec received only 40.1 percent of the federal transfers in the form of cash, 
amounting to $298.2 million. This was because Quebec opted out of the federal 
programs and received a special abatement of 8.5 personal income tax points for 
the EPF rather than cash transfers. The value of these points was subtracted from 
the cash transfers and added to the tax transfers in Quebec. With higher tax bases in 
the province, the richer provinces such as Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia 
ended up with a higher value of tax transfers. Since the tax points transferred were 
equalized to the national average, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan all had 40.7 percent of the 
total federal contributions in the form of tax transfers.8 
As mentioned earlier, the federal grant for postsecondary education was based 
on 32.1 percent of the EPF total transfers.9 Table 2 presents the annual federal 
grant to the provinces for postsecondary education under the EPF arrangements 
from 1977 to 1983. Total federal grants for postsecondary education increased 
from $2.1 billion in 1977 to $3.64 billion in 1983, which represented an annual 
growth rate of 13 percent. Over the period 1977-83, the federal government trans-
ferred a total of $17.6 billion to the provinces. 
Table 3 shows the real federal transfers to postsecondary education from 
1977-78 to 1982-83. In real terms, annual federal transfers to provinces were 
constant at $1.3 billion since 1978-79. Thus, the annual national growth rate was 
only 1.3 percent from 1977 to 1983. Between 1977-78 and 1982-83, the federal 
government contributed a total of $8 billion in 1971-72 constant dollars. 
Real per capita federal transfers to postsecondary education from 1977-78 to 
1982-83 is shown in Table 4. After thé EPF was introduced in 1977, there were 
still large discrepancies in per capita grant among the provinces. In 1977-78, for 
example, Prince Edward Island received $48.04 per capita while Quebec received 
$55.23 per capita. From 1979 onwards, the per capita grant became more uniform 
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TABLE 1 
FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1 979 - 80 
( in current thousands of dollars ) 
Total 
Cash A Tax h Federal 
Transfers % Transfers 9- Transfers O. "O 
Nf Id. 39,080 59 .3 26,833 40.7 65,913 100, .0 
P.E.I. 8,461 59 .3 5,811 40.7 14,272 100. ,0 
N.S. 58,461 59 .3 40,140 40.7 98,601 100, .0 
N.B. 48,075 59 .3 33,011 40.7 81,086 100. ,0 
Quebec 298,232 40 . 1 444,857 59.9 743,089 100. ,0 
Ontario 554,804 55 . 7 440,827 44.3 995,631 100. ,0 
Man i toba 71,468 59 .3 49,073 40.7 120,541 100, ,0 
Sask. 66,116 59 .3 45,398 40.7 111,514 100, ,0 
Alta. 121,225 47 .8 132,560 52.2 253,785 100, ,0 
B.C. 154,790 51 . 1 148,376 48.9 303,166 100, .0 
T o t a l C 1,425,025 51 .0 1,370,659 49.0 2,795,684 100, .0 
Notes: The cash transfers include the basic cash contribution, 
the transitional adjustment payment and the levelling 
adjustment payment. 
b Tax transfers consist of one percent of the corporate 
income tax and 13.5 percent of the personal income tax. 
c These figures include federal grants to both Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Hence, this total is greater 
than the sum of all the provinces as shown in the Table. 
Sources: Computed from the Department of the Secretary of State, 
Unpublished Data. 
for all provinces except Alberta. As a result of the new 1982-87 EPF arrange-
ments, the per capita real grant was equalized in all provinces in 1982-83. 
Interestingly enough, the per capita real grant declined in most provinces from 
$56 in 1981-82 to $53 in 1982-83. 
Table 5 shows the real federal contribution per full-time equivalent student.10 
Full-time equivalent student is used instead of full-time student in this Table 
because part-time enrolment accounted for more than 20 percent of the total 
postsecondary enrolment. As shown in Table 5, there were large disparities in the 
real federal contribution per student among the provinces. In the first two years of 
the EPF arrangements, there were modest increases in the per student federal 
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TABLE 2 
ANNUAL FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
UNDER THE ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS FINANCING, 1977-83 a 
(in current thousands of dollars) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979 > — 80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 48,685 57,484 65, 913 72,683 80,721 84,274 
P.E.I. 9,985 12,121 14, 272 15,802 17,419 18,181 
N.S. 74,868 86,590 98, 601 108,671 120,501 125,804 
N.B. 59,572 70,367 81 , 086 89,514 99,025 103,358 
Que. 599,040 664,572 743, 089 821,775 915,503 959,394 
Ont. 767,176 879,342 995, 631 1,102,378 1,226,440 1 ,284,854 
Man . 94,579 107,638 120, 541 131,867 145,926 152,411 
Sask. 83,089 97,090 111, 514 123,574 137,688 144,726 
Alta. 176,147 209,211 253, 785 298,852 337,822 342,530 
B.C. 217,156 256,867 303 , 166 348,393 394,171 414,708 
b 
Can. 2,136,376 2,448,275 2,795, 684 3,122,471 3,485,303 3,640,692 
Notes: a. These figures include both cash and tax transfers. 
b. This total includes federal grants to both Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Hence this total is greater 
than the sum of all the provinces as shown in the Table. 
Sources: Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Federal-Provineial 
Programs and Activities. 
Department of the Secretary of State, Annual Reports• 
Department of the Secretary of State, Unpublished Data. 
contributions. From 1980-81 onwards, the federal contribution per full-time 
equivalent student declined gradually in all provinces. These declines in per 
student federal contribution were caused by the surge in postsecondary enrolment 
across the country since 1980-81. Thus, it is not surprising to note that federal 
funds on a per student basis actually declined under the EPF arrangements because 
postsecondary enrolment was not taken into account in the calculations of the 
federal payments. 
Figure 1 compares the rate of growth of real postsecondary education operating 
costs and real federal contributions to postsecondary education. One interesting 
point is that the growth rate of federal contributions actually declined after the EPF 
was introduced. At the same time, the growth rate of postsecondary education 
operating costs declined in the first three years but rose steadily in subsequent 
years. From 1980-81 onwards, the annual growth rate of operating costs exceeded 
that of federal contributions. The implication is that the growth of the EPF 
payment to postsecondary education did not keep pace with the operating costs. 
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TABLE 3 
REAL FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
UNDER THE ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS FINANCING, 1977-83° 
( in constant thousands of dollars, 1971-72=100 ) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1 98 C 1-81 1981 -82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 28,272 31,224 32,168 32, 075 32, 275 30,679 
P.E.I. 5, 799 6,584 6, 965 6, 974 6, 965 6,618 
N.S. 43,477 47,034 48,122 47 , 957 48, 181 45,797 
N.B. 34,595 38,222 39,573 39, 503 39, 594 37,626 
Que . 347,870 360,980 362,660 362, 650 366, 050 349,252 
Ont. 445,510 477,640 485,910 486, 490 490, 380 467,730 
Man . 54,924 58,467 58,829 58, 194 58, 347 55,483 
Sask . 48,251 52,738 54,424 54, 534 55, 053 52,685 
Alta. 102,290 113,640 123,860 131 , 890 135, 070 124,692 
B.C. 126,110 139,530 147,960 153, 750 157, 610 150,968 
Can. b 1,240,637 1,329,862 1,364,414 1,377, 966 1,393, 564 1,325,334 
Notes: a. These figures include both cash and tax transfers, 
using the GNE deflator for deflation. 
b. This total includes federal grants to both Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Hence this total is greater 
than the sum of all the provinces as shown in the Table. 
Source: Computed from data in Table 2 and Statistics Canada, 
Nat ional Income and Expenditure Account. 
From the above discussions, it is evident that the total federal contributions to 
postsecondary education in real terms were fairly constant over the six-year 
period between 1977 and 1983. As mentioned earlier, the EPF payment was 
determined by the growth of the economy rather than by the growth of the higher 
education costs. The surge in postsecondary enrolment in the last three years 
inevitably increased the operating costs of postsecondary institutions. This 
implies that the federal contributions actually fell behind the higher education 
costs. As a consequence, both the per capita and the per student federal 
contributions declined gradually since 1980-81. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The EPF arrangements had four budgetary implications. First, the new funding 
arrangements allowed the federal government to have a better control and a more 
accurate forecast of the amount of the transfers. This was because the federal funds 
were no longer tied to provincial expenditures on the basis of a 50:50 cost sharing 
formula. Increases in the operating expenditures in higher education did not lead to 
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TABLE 4 
REAL PER CAPITA FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO POST-SECONDARY 
EDUCATION, 1 9 7 7 - 8 3 a 
( in constant dollars, 1971-72 = 100 ) 







































































Can. b 53.01 56.26 57.10 56.96 56.96 53.58 
Notes: a. These figures include both cash and tax transfers. 
b. This total includes federal grants to both Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Hence this total is greater 
than the sum of all the provinces as shown in the Table. 
Sources: Computed from Table 3 and Statistics Canada, 
Quarterly Estimates of Population for Canada and the 
Provinces. 
a corresponding increase in federal transfers. As a consequence, the uncontrol-
lable feature of the matching grants was eliminated. 
Second, the financial arrangements gave the provinces more flexibility in the 
allocation of their own funds since the EPF payments were unconditional. The 
provinces were allowed to structure their own spending priorities over the various 
social programs according to their own preferences. Thus, the provinces might 
choose to spend a portion of the federal grant designated for postsecondary 
education on some other social programs that were more preferred by the 
provinces. 
Third, the provinces were ensured greater equality in per capita grants under the 
block funding. Hence, the wide disparities in per capita grants among the 
provinces under the previous cost-sharing program were eliminated. 
Finally, the new 1982-87 EPF arrangements led to revenue losses for the 
provincial governments on two grounds. First, under the new arrangements, the 
equalization associated with EPF tax transfers was deducted from the entitlement 
to determine the cash transfer (see Department of Finance, November 1981, pp. 
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TABLE 5 
REAL FEDERAL TRANSFERS PER FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT & 
( in constant dollars, 1971-72=100 ) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 2 ,851 3,398 3,286 3, ,119 2, ,849 2,371 
P.E.I. 2 ,256 2,707 2,958 2, ,928 2, ,738 2,431 
N.S. 1 ,863 2,053 2,122 2 , 064 1 ,989 1 ,752 
N.B. 2 ,444 2,741 2,805 2, ,738 2 , 547 2,232 
Que. 1 ,442 1 ,451 1 ,442 1 , 405 1 ,372 1 ,246 
Ont. 1 ,807 1 ,945 1 ,921 1 , 833 1 ,758 1 ,572 
Man. 2 ,201 2,455 2,555 2, ,441 2 ,287 1 ,980 
Sask. 2 ,415 2,713 2,815 2, ,769 2 ,600 2,281 
Alta . 1 ,962 2,196 2,389 2, ,472 2 , 384 1 ,989 
B.C. 2 ,445 2,684 2,817 2, ,826 2, ,793 2,498 
5 
Can. 1 ,807 1 ,928 1 ,949 1 , 900 1 , ,836 1 ,635 
Notes: a. These transfers are calculated on a full-time equivalent 
basis. That is, full-time university and college students 
plus a full-time equivalent of part-time university students 
based on a conversion factor of 3 to 1. 
b. This total includes federal grants to both Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Hence this total is greater 
than the sum of all the provinces as shown in the Table. 
Source: Computed from data in Table 3 and Statistics Canada, 
Education in Canada. 
45-47). Hence, the value of EPF cash transfer was reduced by including an 
associated equalization as an integral part of the calculations. Second, both the 
transitional and levelling adjustment payments were dropped as components of the 
cash transfer.11 If these payments disappeared in 1981-82, then their deletions 
would have no impact on the size of total federal transfer. In fact, no province 
received the levelling adjustment payments in the fiscal year 1981-82 (Department 
of Finance, 1983). On the other hand, the transitional adjustment payment did not 
disappear in 1981-82. Thus, the removal of the transitional adjustment payment in 
1982 meant provinces received less than the amount they would have received 
under an extension of the old arrangements (Perry, 1983). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the escalating costs of higher education and the persistent provincial 
resistance to the shared-cost program subsequently persuaded the federal 
government to replace the conditional grant with the block grant. Prior to the block 
funding in 1977, provinces often complained about the federal intrusion into an 
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Figure 1 
Rate of Growth of Real Post-Secondary Education Operating Costs 
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aPederal contributions and operating costs are adjusted by the GNE deflator. 
Sources: Based on clata in Table 3 and Statistics Canada, Financial Statistics 
of Education. 
area of provincial jurisdiction; an intrusion which distorted their spending 
priorities. They also complained that the shared-cost programs caused them to 
spend more than they needed to spend in order to provide a given level of services. 
By providing provinces with greater flexibility with regard to program decisions 
under the EPF arrangements, the federal government has minimized provincial 
dissatisfaction on the one hand and has controlled costs of postsecondary 
education on the other. 
The prospects for the federal funding of higher education in Canada will likely 
remain gloomy for the rest of the decade in light of the growing federal deficits. 
Obviously, the postsecondary portion of the EPF payments is a vulnerable target 
for the federal spending cuts since these transfers were not politically visible to the 
public.12 The renewed EPF arrangement in 1982 was a deliberate attempt by the 
federal government to reduce the federal transfers to the provinces (see 
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Department of Finance, November 1981). It is thus unlikely that the federal 
government will restore funding increases in postsecondary education at this 
point in time, or even in the distant future. Given the continued federal reduction in 
the funding of postsecondary education, universities and colleges in Canada 
should expect further cutbacks in the years to come. 
1 It should be noted that the percentage allocation, which was based on the base year program costs of 
the three established programs, was only a national allocation. Since the provinces were not obliged 
to spend the designated 32.1 percent of the EPF transfers on higher education, they could therefore 
spend more or less than 32.1 percent of the EPF transfers on higher education if they preferred. 
2 It should be noted that, in equalizing tax points, those provinces which had tax transfers below the 
national average were brought up to the national average, but those above were not brought down. 
3 The rationale for choosing 1975-76 as an appropriate base year is that the year is recent enough to be 
relevant. Furthermore, the chances for provinces to overestimate the expenditures into the base year 
are assumed to be minimized as the year ended before negotiations began. 
4 The revenue guarantee program introduced in 1972 was a five-year transition program to ensure 
that provinces would not lose personal or corporate tax revenues as a result of the 1972 tax reform. 
This is because the provincial personal income taxes collected under the tax collections agreements 
were expressed as a percentage of federal tax bases. If there was a tax reform, any changes in the 
federal tax rate or base could affect provincial tax collections. Hence, there was some uncertainty 
concerning the tax rates that the provinces would have to set to obtain equivalent revenues. Under 
the revenue guarantee program, the federal government would compensate a province revenue 
losses resulting from the tax reform. When the program was expired in 1977, the provinces asked 
for four points of personal income tax in compensation. The provinces settled for two personal 
income tax points, (one in cash, and the other one in tax transfers), which were added to the tax and 
cash contributions under the EPF arrangements. The cash equivalent of one equalized personal 
income tax point given to the provinces under the EPF arrangements was intended to persuade 
provinces to integrate the hospital insurance program into the EPF arrangements. 
5 The growth of the nominal per capita GNP can be expressed by a three-year moving average of the 
GNP escalator. GNP escalator is simply the cube root of the per capita GNP of the previous year 
over the per capita GNP 4 years ago. Algebraically, the GNP escalator is defined by the following 
formula: 
It should be noted that the GNP per capita in both years ( t - 1) and (t-4) are measured in calendar 
year rather than in fiscal year. 
6 The legislation requires the federal government to provide three years' notice in advance for any 
modifications or terminations of the EPF arrangements. 
7 The "six and five" program was an incomes policy that the federal government introduced in order 
to influence wage and price formation in the economy. The limits on the wage increases of six 
percent in 1982-83 (from July 1982 to June 1983) and five percent in 1983-84 in the public sector 
provided a signal to the private sector to adopt a similar policy by limiting the wage increases by six 
and five percent in these consecutive years. Consequently, the wage and price increases in all 
sectors of economy were expected to go up by only six percent in the first year and five percent in 
the second year, thus lowering the expected rate of inflation (inflationary expectations). This would 
cause inflation rates to drop to the levels that were close to the six and five percent. 
8 Initially, these provinces had per capita tax yields below the national average. Hence, the tax points 
transferred to these provinces were brought up to the national average. 
9 The annual federal transfers are intended not to show the exact amount of funds allocated to 
postsecondary education by provinces, but rather to indicate the designated amount that the 
provinces are supposed to spend on higher education. 
NOTES 
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10 Part-time enrolment is converted to full-time equivalent enrolment by using a factor of 3 to 1 (i.e. 3 
part-time students to 1 full-time student). 
11 It should be stressed that the changes made in 1982 were designed not only to simplify the complex 
EPF funding formula, but also to reduce federal payments to the three established programs at a 
time of fiscal restraint. In fact, the federal government projected that the new EPF funding formula 
could reduce federal payments to the three established programs by $5.7 billion over the five-year 
period between 1982-83 and 1986-87 (Department of Finance, November 1981). This suggests that 
the federal government intended to cut back the transfer payments to the three established programs 
in order to reduce the federal deficits. 
12 It should be noted that the cash component of the EPF transfer for postsecondary education is 
particularly vulnerable for federal cutbacks. This is because it is easier for the federal government to 
reduce the cash payment than to retract the tax transfer. 
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